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Abstract 
One  of  the  outstanding  results  of  three  decades  of  laboratory  market  research  is  that 
under  rather  weak  conditions  prices  and  quantities  in competitive  experimental  markets 
converge  to  the  competitive  equilibrium.  Yet,  the  design  of  these  experiments  ruled  out 
gift  exchange  or  reciprocity  motives,  that  is. subjects  could  not  reciprocate  for  a gift.  This 
paper  reports  the  results  of  experiments  which  do  not  rule  out  reciprocal  interactions 
between  buyers  and  sellers.  Sellers  have  the  opportunity  to  choose  quality  levels  which 
are  above  the  levels  enforceable  by  buyers.  In  principle  they  can,  therefore,  reward  buyers 
who  offer  them  high  prices.  Yet,  such  reciprocating  behaviour  lowers  sellers’  monetary 
payoff  and  is,  hence,  not  subgame  perfect.  The  data  reveal  that  many  sellers  behave 
reciprocally.  This  generates  a positive  relation  between  prices  and  quality  at  the  aggreg- 
ate  level  which  is  anticipated  by  the  buyers.  As  a  result,  buyers  are  willing  to  pay  prices 
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1.  Introduction 
Most  economic  models  are  based  on  the  assumption  of  rational  and  selfish 
agents.  In  these  models  it is ruled  out  that  fairness  motives  can  affect  behaviour. 
During  the  last  decade  many  researchers  have,  however,  provided  evidence 
which  indicates  that  the  behaviour  of economic  agents  may  well  be  affected  by 
considerations  of  fairness  (e.g.  Kahneman  et  al.,  1986).  The  most  convincing 
evidence  for  the  behavioural  importance  of fairness  is provided  by  the  results  of 
simple  one-shot  ultimatum  games  (Giith  et  al.,  1982;  Ochs  and  Roth,  1989:  for 
surveys  see  Giith  and  Tietz,  1990  and  Roth,  1995).  ln  an  ultimatum  game 
a proposer  has  to  propose  a division  of a  fixed  bargaining  cake.  The  responder 
can  accept  or  reject  the  proposed  division.  In  case  of  rejection  both  players  get 
nothing  while  if the  responder  accepts  each  player  receives  the  proposed  shares. 
For  this  bargaining  game  the  standard  game  theoretic  model  predicts  that 
proposers  demand  the  whole  bargaining  cake  while  responders  are  willing  to 
accept  any  positive  share  of  the  cake.  Yet,  responders  usually  reject  positive 
offers  which  they  consider  as  being  too  low.  Most  proposers  seem  to  anticipate 
responders’  behaviour  and  offer  them  approximately  40%  of  the  available 
amount  of money.  This  outcome  is at  odds  with  a model  of rational  and  purely 
selfish  behaviour  but  it  can  easily  be  explained  in  terms  of  fairness:  Since 
responders  are  willing  to  reject  unfair  shares  proposers.  in  general,  offer  them 
almost  half  of  the  available  cake. 
In  principle,  considerations  of  fairness  might  also  affect  the  outcome  of 
competitive  markets.  At  the  theoretical  level  many  authors  have  claimed  that 
fairness  is also  likely  to  affect  market  outcomes  (e.g.  Okun,  198 1; Akerlof,  1982; 
Akerlof  and  Yellen,  1990;  Fehr  and  Kirchsteiger,  1994).  At  the  empirical  level, 
however,  there  does  not  seem  to  exist  the  kind  of  rigorous  evidence  that  is 
available  in  the  case  of  bargaining  games.  Quite  the  contrary.  The  results  of 
competitive  experimental  markets  show  that  the  competitive  equilibrium  out- 
come  is  usually  reached  within  a  few  periods  (Smith,  1982;  Davis  and  Holt. 
1993). Even  if the  equilibrium  is very  unfair  by  almost  any  conceivable  definition 
of fairness,  that  is, if the  whole  market  income  is reaped  by  only  one  side  (buyers 
or  sellers)  of  the  market,  one  can  observe  convergence  to  the  competitive equilibrium  (Smith,  1976;  Cason  and  Williams,  1990;  Roth  et  al.,  1991;  Kachel- 
meier  and  Shehata,  1992). 
In  the  above  mentioned  competitive  experimental  markets  subjects  trade  a well 
defined  experimental  good  in  the  sense  that  buyers  (sellers)  know  with  certainty 
the  monetary  value  (cost)  of  the  good.  In  particular,  the  quality  of  the  good  is 
unambiguously  determined  before  a pair  of traders  concludes  a contract  because 
the  ‘delivery’  of  the  quality  is  exogenously  enforced  by  the  experimenter.  This 
paper  reports  the  results  of experiments  which  deviate  in  one  important  respect 
from  the  complete  contracts  design:  The  quality  of  the  good  is  no  longer 
exogenously  enforced.  Instead,  buyers  have  to  make  price  offers  in  a  one-sided 
oral  auction  without  knowing  the  quality  they  will  receive  from  those  sellers  who 
accept  their  price  offer.  After  a seller  has  accepted  an  offer  he has  to  determine  the 
quality  of  the  good.  Since  our  design  rules  out  that  a  trader  can  build  up 
a reputation  and  since  sellers’  costs  are  positively  related  to  the  quality  delivered, 
money  maximizing  sellers  will  always  choose  the  minimum  quality,  denoted  by  ~1”. 
Rational  buyers  will  of  course  anticipate  sellers’  behaviour  and.  therefore,  the 
market  should  operate  as if only  q.  were  enforceable.  This  means  that  a competitive 
experimental  market  with  rational  money  maximizing  agents  should  be expected  to 
converge  to  the  competitive  equilibrium  that  corresponds  to  the  quality  level  q,,. 
The  parameters  of  our  experiments  are  chosen  such  that  at  this  competitive 
equilibrium  the  whole  market  income  is  reaped  by  the  buyers.  Therefore,  the 
competitive  price  coincides  with  the  sellers’  (exogenously  specified)  reservation 
price.  On  the  basis  of  the  results  of  previously  conducted  experiments  (Fehr  et 
al.,  1993) (hereafter  FKR,  1993) we  hypothesized  that  sellers  would  be  willing  to 
respond  to  the  payment  of  prices  above  their  reservation  level  with  quality 
choices  above  q,.  If  this  kind  of  reciprocation  is  sufficiently  strong  it  is  in  the 
buyers’  monetary  interest  to  pay  more  than  the  reservation  price.  Because  of the 
sellers’  opportunity  to  reciprocate  for  a  generous  price  offer  we  called  this 
experiment  the  reciprocity  treatment  (henceforth  RT). 
The  experimental  data  confirm  that  sellers’  quality  choices  vary  positively 
with  the  price  paid.  Moreover,  sellers’  reciprocal  responses  were  strong  enough 
to  render  a high  price  policy  profitable  for  the  buyers.  As a result,  buyers  offered 
prices  which  were  more  than  twice  as  high  as  the  sellers’  reservation  price.  To 
check  whether  it  is  indeed  sellers’  reciprocal  behaviour  that  induces  buyers  to 
offer  high  prices  we  implemented  a control  treatment  (henceforth  CT)  in  which 
sellers  could  not  reciprocate  because  the  quality  q of the  good  was  exogenously 
fixed.  It  turns  out  that  the  same  buyers  who  pay  rather  high  prices  when  sellers 
have  an  opportunity  to  reciprocate  try  to  relentlessly  push  down  prices  to 
sellers’  reservation  levels  when  q is  exogenously  fixed. 
These  results  challenge  models  which  rely  exclusively  on  rational  and  selfish 
agents.  We  show,  however,  that  sellers’  reciprocal  behaviour  need  not  be 
considered  as  irrational  if  one  allows  for  interdependent  preferences.  If 
sellers  value  buyers’  monetary  payoffs  positively  reciprocation  can  be  perfectly 4  E.  Feh?  rt  al.  i  Euuoprm  Economic  Rrrim  42  (IWK)  i-34 
rational.  It  is then  possible  to  interpret  the  results  of our  reciprocity  experiments 
as a noncooperative  equilibrium  of rational  agents  that  entails  a noncompetitive 
outcome. 
Our  design  can  be  framed  in  labour  market  terms:  Buyers  are  firms  who  make 
wage  offers  to  the  workers  (sellers).  After  accepting  an  offer  the  worker  has  to 
determine  his  effort  level.  Due  to  incomplete  supervision  and  verification  tech- 
nologies  firms  may  be  unable  to  enforce  an  effort  (quality)  level  qO.  Since  in  our 
design  buyers  (firms)  are  price  (wage)  setters,  and  since  the  motivation  problem  is 
particularly  important  in  employment  relations,  a  labour  market  interpretation 
seems  to  be  quite  natural.  When  viewed  from  the  labour  market  perspective  our 
results  provide  support  for  equilibrium  theories  of  involuntary  unemployment 
that  are  based  on  the  notion  of fairness  (Akerlof,  1982; Akerlof  and  Yellen,  1990). 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  In  the  next  section  we 
present  the  basic  design  of our  experiments.  In  Section  3 we  discuss  the  predic- 
tions  under  the  assumption  that  all  subjects  are  selfish  money  maximizers 
whereas  in  Section  4 we  determine  the  quality  choices  and  reservation  prices  of 
sellers  who  have  interdependent  preferences.  Section  5 presents  the  details  of the 
experimental  procedures  and  Section  6  documents  the  empirical  regularities. 
Section  7 summarizes  the  results  and  discusses  them  in  the  light  of  competing 
interpretations. 
2.  A  market  with  reciprocation  opportunities 
Consider  a  market  with  L  sellers  and  N  buyers  with  L  > N.  Each  seller  can 
sell  at  most  one  unit  of  the  good  traded.  Likewise,  each  buyer  can  buy  at  most 
one  unit.  The  costs  of  providing  one  unit  of  the  good  with  quality  q E [qO,  q’], 
0  <  q,,  <  q”,  are  given  by 
“f-t  c(q),  .f > 01  (‘(40)  = 0,  c’ > 0,  d’ > 0 
for  each  seller  where  c’ and  c” denote  derivatives.  q,  (q’)  is the  exogenously  given 
minimum  (maximum)  quality  of the  good  whilef  represents  a positive  constant. 
Each  seller’s  monetary  payoff  from  a  trade  is  defined  by 
s  =  17  -f‘-  c(q).  (1) 
where  p denotes  the  price  at  which  the  good  is  traded.  Each  buyer’s  monetary 
payoff  is  given  by 
B  =  (J  -  P)%  (2) 
where  J’ is  an  exogenously  given  constant  and  ~1  >$ 
The  RT  consists  of two  stages.  At  the  first  stage  buyers  are  allowed  to  propose 
prices  in  a  one-sided  oral  auction.  The  essential  feature  of such  an  auction  is that 
sellers  can  make  no  counteroffers.  Buyers  have,  however,  no  opportunity  to 
make  bids  to  specific  sellers  because  every  seller  can  accept  every  bid.  Price  bids E.  Frhr  et  al.  / Europrnn  Economic  Reciew  42  (1998)  IL.74  5 
have  to  be  in  the  interval  [If, ~1. According  to  Eq.  (2) buyers  can,  therefore,  make 
no  losses5. 
If a seller  accepts  a price  bid  p, a binding  contract  is concluded  and  stage  one  is 
completed  for  both  the  seller  and  the  buyer.  If a buyer’s  bid  is not  accepted  she  is 
free to  change  her  bid,  but  the  new  bid  has  to  be  higher  than  the  previous  highest 
bid  (possibly  by  another  buyer)  which  has  not  yet  been  accepted’.  The  first  stage 
ends  if either  all  sellers  have  accepted  an  offer  or  if a prespecified  amount  of time 
has  elapsed.  The  monetary  payoffs  of buyers  and  sellers  who  do  not  trade  are  zero. 
At  the  second  stage  those  sellers  who  have  accepted  a bid  have  to choose  a level  of 
q  from  the  set  [qO, (1’1 of  feasible  quality  levels.  Notice  that  buyers  can  neither 
stipulate  a quality  level  nor  are  there  any  sanctions  associated  with  the  choice  of q7. 
The  difference  between  the  RT  and  the  CT  concerns  only  the  second  stage;  in 
the  CT  there  is no  second  stage  because  the  experimenter  ensures  that  all  goods 
are  traded  at  an  exogenously  specified  quality  level  of  q =  1. The  total  cost  of 
providing  one  unit  of this  good  is,f,  while  the  monetary  value  of such  a good  for 
the  buyers  is  given  by  J+  If pc  denotes  the  price  at  which  the  good  is traded  in 
the  CT,  the  monetary  payoffs  are  given  by 
&  =  PC  -fc  (3) 
for  the  seller,  and  by 
&  =  l’c -  PC  (4) 
for  the  buyer. 
3.  Predictions 
What  are  the  properties  of  the  competitive  equilibrium  in  the  RT  if  it  is 
common  knowledge  that  all  subjects  are  selfish  money  maximizers?  For  any 
given  price  a money  maximizing  seller  will  choose  q =  q.  because  c(y) is strictly 
increasing  in  q. Rational  buyers  will  of course  anticipate  that  only  yO is enforce- 
able  and  thatfrepresents  each  seller’s  reservation  price.  Due  to  the  excess  supply 
‘The  main  reason  why  we  wanted  to  rule  out  losses  was  that,  due  to  loss  aversion.  the  behaviour 
of  experimental  subjects  may  change  considerably  under  conditions  of  potential  losses  (see  Kahne- 
man  and  Tversky.  1992).  Since  our  expel-iments  aimed  at  isolating  the  Impact  of  reciprocal 
behaviour  on  the  outcome  of  competitive  experimental  markets  we  did  not  want  our  data  to  be 
polluted  with  loss  aversion  phenomena.  It  is  a  common  requirement  in  experimental  markets  to 
forbtd  that  buyers  (sellers)  trade  at  prices  above  (below)  their  redemption  value  4’ (costf).  In  Fehr 
and  Gachter  (1997)  a  design  with  losses  is  examined. 
hThts  bidding  rule  is  sometimes  called  ‘improvement  rule‘.  The  improvement  rule  is  usually 
applied  in  experimental  markets.  Notice  that  it does  not  prevent  underbidding.  If a  subject  wants  to 
make  a lower  bid  than  the  highest  ‘going’  bid  1~’  she  has  to  wait  until  p’ 1s accepted.  After  that  she  can 
bid  a  price  below  p’. 
’ In  Fehr  ct  al.  (1996)  we  implement  a  design  which  allows  buyer-s  to  offer  contracts  that  stipulate 
a  desir-ed  q-level.  In  case  that  seller-s  do  not  deliver  the  desired  q-level they  are  fined  with  a  certain 
pt-obability. of  sellers  (L  >  N)  buyers  will  have  no  reason  to  offer  more  than  .f: Hence,  the 
competitive  equilibrium  is characterized  by  N  trades  at  p  =fand  q =  q,,. In  the 
market  with  complete  contracts  a  similar  reasoning  shows  that  the  competitive 
equilibrium  with  money  maximizing  agents  exhibits  N trades  at  a price  of pc  =.fc. 
Plott  and  Smith  (1978)  and  Walker  and  Williams  (1988)  have  conducted 
several  one-sided  oral  auctions  with  a  complete  contracts  design.  Their  results 
convincingly  show  that  these  markets  converge  to  the  competitive  equilibrium. 
Yet,  since  contracts  in  these  experimental  markets  were  complete  there  were  no 
possibilities  for  reciprocation. 
We  know  of only  one  series  of experiments  in  which  reciprocal  behaviour,  as 
described  in  Section  1, permanently  survived  in  competitive  experimental  mar- 
kets  (FKR,  1993).  In  these  experiments  q was  positively  related  to  y  and  the 
market  price  did  not  converge  towardsf:  Even  after  twelve  trading  periods  the 
observed  average  price  was  significantly  abovef:  The  design  of FKR  is similar  to 
our  RT.  The  fact  that  p  does  not  converge  towards  ,f’ in  this  design  can  be 
interpreted  in  several  ways:  (i)  It  may  be  due  to  buyers’  altruism  or  buyers’ 
attempts  to  obey  some  equity  norm.  (ii) It  may  be  caused  by  sellers’  willingness 
to  reject  prices  that  are  close  toj1  If buyers  anticipate  sellers’  willingness  to  reject 
low  offers  it is in  their  interest  to offer  prices  that  are  suficiently  abovef:  (iii) Prices 
abovefmay  also  be  caused  by  the  apparent  willingness  of many  sellers  to  choose 
a  high  q in  response  to  a  high  p.  If  there  is  a  sufficiently  steep  positive  relation 
between  p  and  q it  is  in  the  pecuniary  interest  of  buyers  to  offer  high  prices. 
On  the  basis  of the  evidence  from  the  RT  alone  it  is  not  possible  to  discrimi- 
nate  between  these  explanations.  The  main  purpose  of  the  experiments  we 
report  in  this  paper  is to  discriminate  between  explanations(i)  and  (ii) on  the  one 
hand  and  explanation  (iii)  on  the  other  hand.  We  are,  thus.  interested  in  the 
question  whether  sellers’  reciprocal  behaviour  exerts  an  independent  impact  on 
price  formation.  In  the  next  section  we show  that  we can  answer  this  question  by 
comparing  sellers’  share  of  the  surplus  in  the  RT,  s, with  their  shares  .sc in  the 
CT”.  In  the  CT  explanation  (iii)  cannot  be  applied  because  sellers  cannot 
reciprocate.  Therefore,  s >  sc  indicates  that  the  opportunity  to  reciprocate  has 
an  additional  impact  on  price  formation  in  the  RT. 
Notice  that  the  answer  to  our  question  has  important  implications  for  the 
interpretation  of  a  high-price  outcome  in  the  RT.  If  high  prices  are  due  to 
explanation  (ii) one  may  argue  that  the  outcome  in  the  RT  represents  a competi- 
tive  equilibrium.  In  this  equilibrium  p is abovef’because  sellers’  reservation  price 
p’ is above,&  If, however,  sellers’  reciprocal  behaviour  has  an  additional  impact  on 
price  formation  actual  prices  in  the  RT  represent  a  noncompetitive  outcome 
because  they  are  above  pr. In  our  view  the  fact  that  a noncompetitive  outcome  can 
persist  in  a competitive  trading  institution  constitutes  a rather  remarkable  result. 
a Readers  who  arc  not  interested  in  the  details  of  this  argument  can  skip  Section  4. E.  Frhr  et  al.  ! European  Econotnic  Rrview  42  (IYYK)  I-34  7 
4.  Quality  choice  and  reservation  prices  with  interdependent  preferences 
Sellers  who  choose  q >  q,,  in  case  of  generous  price  offers  do  not  act  like 
money  maximizers.  A  natural  interpretation  of  their  behaviour  is  that  they 
prefer  to  choose  4 >  qO, that  is,  that  they  show  a  concern  for  their  buyer’s 
monetary  payoff  if they  receive  a ‘gift’. In  this  section  we  show  that  a reciprocal 
outcome  in  the  RT  can  be  caused  by  interdependent  preferences.  In  addition,  we 
present  a  method  that  allows  us  to  judge  whether  actual  prices  in  the  RT  are 
above  sellers’  (unobservable)  reservation  prices. 
To  allow  for  reciprocal  behaviour  we  assume  that  sellers’  preferences  are 
given  by 
u =  up, B)  us >  0,  (5) 
where  us  =  &/?S  and  B is the  monetary  payoff  of the  buyer  with  whom  the  seller 
is matched.  If ?u/?B  = ug  <  0 (ug >  0) for  all  feasible  (S, B)-combinations  we call 
a seller  envious  (altruistic).  If clg =  0 he is called  selfish.  It  is obvious  that  a selfish 
or  envious  seller  will  never  choose  4 >  q,, because  nonminimum  quality  choices 
decrease  S and  increase  B.  Reciprocity  means  that  a seller  chooses  ‘low’ quality 
levels  if p is ‘low’ while  if p is ‘high’  he chooses  a ‘high’  q. Therefore,  it may  well  be 
that  a  seller  who  behaves  reciprocally  exhibits  locally  selfish  or  envious  prefer- 
ences  (ug  I  0) if p and,  hence,  S is ‘low’.  that  is, he  responds  to  a ‘low’ price  with 
q =  q,,.  Yet,  if  the  price  is  sufficiently  high  he  becomes  locally  altruistic  and 
chooses  q >  q,. 
4. I.  Implications  of‘pvqjitahle  price  increases 
Reciprocal  sellers  behave  as if they  value  B positively  at  some  combinations  of 
S and  B. Suppose  that  a  seller  responds  to  a price  increase  by  a quality  increase 
which  is sufficient  to  generate  an  overall  rise  in  B.  Does  the  observation  of such 
profitable  price  increases  allow  us  to  characterize  the  sellers’  preferences  in  more 
detail?  Or  more  specifically:  Does  this  seller  value  B as a normal  or  as an  inferior 
‘good’? 
In  order  to  answer  this  question  it  is  useful  to  look  more  closely  at  the  set  of 
return  combinations  that  can  be  attained  for  different  values  of p  and  q.  Using 
Eq.  (2) to  substitute  4 =  B/(y  -  p)  out  of  Eq.  (1) yields 
S =  p  -,f-  c[B/(y  -  p)].  (6) 
Our  assumptions  about  C(  ) ensure  that  S is a decreasing  and  strictly  concave 
function  of B for  B  >  0 and  p  <  J.  For  any  given  p a  rational  seller  chooses  q to 
maximize  Eq.  (5)  subject  to  Eq.  (6).  Any  choice  of  4 =  B/(y  -  p)  determines 
a  particular  (S,  B)-combination  according  to  Eq.  (6).  Thus,  by  choosing  q  the 
seller  is  effectively  choosing  a  particular  (S,  B)-combination  on  the  constraint 
Eq.  (6).  The  optimal  choice  of  S  and  B  (or  q,  respectively)  can,  therefore,  be represented  as  a  tangency  point  between  a  seller’s  indifference  curves  and  the 
graph  of  the  constraint  Eq.  (6)9. 
A  rise  in  p  has  two  effects.  It  shifts  the  constraint  Eq.  (6)  upwards  in  S-B- 
space.  This  gives  rise  to  an  income  effect.  Yet,  it  also  renders  the  constraint 
steeper,  that  is, the  good  B becomes  more  expensive.  This  causes  a  substitution 
effect.  Hence,  if  B  is  a  neutral  good  (neither  normal  nor  nonnormal)  a  rise  in 
p  will  generate  a  decrease  in  B.  Only  if  B  is  a  normal  good,  a  rise  in  p  can 
generate  an  overall  increase  in  B. Therefore,  if  we  observe  in  our  experiments 
that  sellers  responses  to  a price  increase  generate  B-increases  sellers  behave  as  if 
B is  a  normal  good. 
4.2.  Reservation  prices 
One  of our  main  questions  is whether  sellers’ reciprocal  behaviour  induces  buyers 
to  offer  prices  above  sellers’  reservation  price  p’. pr is defined  as the  lowest  price  in 
the feasible  interval  [f;  ~1 for which  the  seller,  if he accepts  this  price,  is not  worse  off 
compared  to  a  rejection.  Therefore,  prices  above  pr make  a seller  strictly  better  off 
compared  to  a non  trade.  This  means  that  if trading  sellers  receive  prices  above  the 
reservation  price  of non  trading  sellers,  the  latter  are  involuntarily  rationed. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  pr  of  se&k  sellers  coincides  with  f:  Globally  altruistic 
sellers  are  even  willing  to  accept  prices  below  J”“.  Only  for  those  sellers  who 
have  (locally)  en&~  preferences  pr >,fcan  occur.  To  see  this,  suppose  that  an 
envious  seller  gets  an  offer  p  =,f:  His  monetary  payoff  from  this  offer  is  zero 
while  his  partner  receives  B =  (~1  -,flqo.  Because  he  values  B  negatively  he 
strictly  prefers  the  monetary  payoff  combination  [0,  01,  which  follows  from 
a  rejection,  over  the  combination  [0,  (J: -.f’)q,J.  Therefore,  to  render  him 
indifferent  between  acceptance  and  rejection  he  must  be  offered  more  than,f: 
The  potential  existence  of envious  subjects  represents  a major  problem.  Since 
it  is  impossible  to  observe  subjects’  preferences  directly,  we  do  not  know  the 
reservation  prices  of envious  subjects.  Therefore,  observing  prices  abovefis  not 
in  itself  sufficient  evidence  for  non  competitive  prices,  i.e.  for  p  >  p’. 
Recent  empirical  research  by  Loewenstein  et  al.  (1989)  as  well  as  the  stylised 
facts  which  emerged  from  ultimatum  game  experiments  also  indicate  that  the 
existence  of  locally  envious  subjects  is  not  just  a  theoretical  possibility.  The 
research  results  of  Loewenstein  et  al.  show  that  disadvantageous  inequality.  in 
general,  causes  a large  utility  loss.  Since  low  prices  imply  a considerable  amount 
‘This  statement  is. of course,  only  true  if preferences  are  convex.  In  a  former  version  of  this  papel- 
we  show  that  all  relevant  conclusions  can  also  be  drawn  without  the  convexity  assumption. 
“Let  q(p) denote  the  utility  maximizing  quality  choice  while  ~(0.0)  represents  the  seller‘s  utility  if 
he  does  not  trade.  If  an  altruistic  seller  accepts  a  price  p  =j’  his  utility  is  II =  I,[  ~  c(qv  )), 
(v -./‘)q(j)]  2  u[  -  c’(qo), (J  -  f‘jq,,]  >  ~(0. 0). The  first  inequality  holds  because  any  seller  (weakly) 
prefers  q(j)  over  qO. The  second  inquality  follows  because  c(qO) =  0  and  I+  >  0.  Since  f  is  a  lower 
bound  for  p  we  set  the  p’  of  altruistic  sellers  equal  to,/  (for  convenience). of disadvantageous  inequality  for the  seller,  it may  well  be that  sellers  p~!fer  to  reject 
such  offers.  There  is also  ample  evidence  that  in  ultimatum  games  the  responders 
reject  low  offers, although  they  would  earn  more  money  if they  accepted  these  offers. 
This  indicates  that  responders’  reservation  prices  are  higher  than  the  reservation 
prices  of  selfish  money  maximizers  which  can  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  (our 
definition  of)  envy:  responders  are  willing  to  give  up  money  in  order  to  reduce  the 
income  of the  proposers  (see  Bolton  (1991)  and  Kirchsteiger  (1994)). 
To  tackle  the  problem  which  arises  if  pr >,f  we  have  developed  a  simple 
method  which  allows  us  to  infer  upper  bounds  for  sellers’  reservation  prices  in 
the  RT  from  the  prices  they  have  accepted  in  the  CT.  Let  us  define  the  seller’s 
share  of  the  (potential)  surplus  (2’ -.f’)  in  the  RT  by  s =  (p -f‘)/(~?  -.f’); 
sc  =  (pc  -fc)j(yc  -.fc):  denotes  the  share  in  the  CT.  Analogously,  we  define  the 
reservation  shares  by  s =  (p’ -f)/(~,  -,f);  and  s:  =  (~5 -,fc)/(yc  -.f,)  where 
p:  denotes  the  reservation  price  in  the  CT.  Our  objective  is  to  show  that  if the 
parameters  of the  RT  and  the  CT  meet  the  condition  J  -f>  ~1~  -fc  >  (~3  -,f‘)q”. 
for  all  types  of sellers  s:  will  be  larger  than  or  equal  to  .sr. Using  the  definitions  of 
s and  s(. we  can  express  the  utility  of  an  envious”  seller  as 
u =  u(X  B) =  tll.s(Y -.f).  (1 -  S)(J’ -.f,qol, 
while  in  the  CT  his  utility  is  given  by 
u  =  u(Sc,  B,)  =  u[sc(!‘c  -,fc),  (1 -  sc)(L’c -.fc)]. 
Suppose  now  that  s =  sc.  Since  y  -,f  >  yc  -  fc  we have  S >  SC. In  addition. 
because  yc  -.fc  >  (y -,f)qo  the  inequality  B,  >  B  holds.  Thus  if  an  envious 
seller  receives  the  same  share  in  the  RT  and  the  CT  he will  be strictly  better  off in 
the  RT.  As  a  consequence,  an  envious  seller  is  strictly  willing  to  trade  if  he 
receives  a  share  .si in  the  RT,  that  is  s:  >  sr. 
What  is the  significance  of .sL  2  s’? If a  seller  accepts  a  certain  share  s,  in  the 
CT,  we  have,  of course,  s,  2  s:.  Together  with  s:  2  s’ we  have,  therefore,  s,  2  sr. 
It  follows  that  a  seller  who  accepted  a certain  share  s,  in  the  CT  will  be  strictly 
better  off  for  all  s >  s,  in  the  RT.  Thus,  if he  cannot  trade  in  the  RT  whereas 
other  sellers  trade  at  s >  s,,  he  is  involuntarily  rationed. 
5.  Experimental  procedures 
In  total  we  organized  four  experimental  sessions”.  In  each  session  subjects 
participated  in  an  RT  as well  as  in  a CT.  There  was  an  excess  supply  of sellers  in 
all  sessions.  In  Sl  and  S2 we had  9 sellers  and  6 buyers,  in  S3 there  were  10 sellers 
I ’ We  restrict  the  argument  to  a  seller  who  is (locally)  envious  because  for  all  other  types  we  have 
pr  =,fand  hence  their  reservation  share  in  the  RT  is  below  their  reservation  share  in  the  CT. 
“Session  I (Sl) was  conducted  at  18 November  1991,  session  2 (S?)  at  22  November  IYYl, session 
3 (S3)  at  16 January  1992  and  session  4  (S4)  at  I7  January  1992. and  7 buyers,  in  S4  we  had  12 sellers  and  8 buyersL3.  In  Section  2 we  described 
the  features  of one  trading  day  of an  RT  and  a CT,  respectively.  As it is common 
practice  in  experimental  economics,  we  allowed  subjects  to  learn  by  repeating 
these  trading  days.  Each  session  consisted  of  16 trading  days  (‘periods’)  and  at 
least  one  trial  period  to  allow  the  participants  to  become  acquainted  with  the 
trading  institution;  these  16  periods  were  divided  into  two  subsessions  of 
8 periods.  In  Sl  and  S3 we conducted  the  CT  during  the  first  8 periods;  in  period 
9-16  the  RT  took  place.  To  control  for  spillovers  between  markets  we changed 
the  order  in  S2  and  S414. 
In  Sl,  S2  and  S3  the  prespecified  time  for  the  one-sided  oral  auction  was 
3 minutes.  In  S4  it  was  4 minutes  because  of the  larger  number  of participants. 
After  three  (four)  minutes  the  market  was  closed  and  those  parties  which  did  not 
succeed  in  trading  earned  zero  profits  in  this  period.  In  the  CT  a trading  day  was 
over  when  the  market  was  closed  while  in  the  RT  the  second  stage  of the  trading 
day  began.  At  this  stage,  sellers  had  to  choose  their  quality  anon~~nously,  i.e. their 
choice  was  only  revealed  to  ‘their’  buyer.  Moreover,  their  choice  was  completely 
unconstrained  in  the  sense  that  there  were  no  sanctions  associated  with  it. 
Before  the  beginning  of a session  each  subject  had  to  draw  a card.  If there  was 
an  ‘S’ on  the  card  he was  a seller,  if a ‘B’, she  was  a buyer.  Sellers  and  buyers  were 
located  in  different  rooms.  During  the  experiment  communication  took  place  by 
means  of a telephone.  Four  supervisors  were  engaged  in  each  session,  two  in  the 
buyers’  room,  two  in  the  sellers’  room.  In  each  room,  one  supervisor  transmitted 
the  price  (acceptance)  and  quality  message  over  the  telephone. 
While  price  messages  were  public  knowledge,  the  information  about  quality 
choices  was  coded.  It  was  known  only  to  the  two  parties  involved.  In  addition, 
buyers  and  sellers  did  not  know  the  identity  of  their  trading  partners.  These 
information  restrictions  were  chosen  to  exclude  group  pressure  effects  on  quality 
choice  and  to  reduce  strategic  spillovers  between  periods  as  much  as  possible. 
Since  the  traders  did  not  know  the  identities  of their  partners  it  was  impossible 
for  buyers  (sellers)  to  reward  the  past  action  of  a  .spec$c  seller  (buyer).  More- 
over,  we  wanted  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of  hidden  side  payments  between 
parties  after  the  experiment. 
The  monetary  returns  for  those  subjects  who  traded  in  the  RT  were  given  by 
the  return  functions  Eqs.  (1) and  (2). The  returns  of  trading  subjects  in  the  CT 
“All  experimental  subjects  were  volunteers.  They  were  students  of  the  University  of Technology 
m  Vienna  and  had  no  knowledge  of  experimental  economics.  They  were  not  students  of  ours  and 
most  of  them  had  never  attended  a course  in economics.  They  were  recruited  with  the  promise  that, 
dependent  on  their  decisions,  they  could  earn  a  considerable  amount  of  money. 
“The  subjects  of  a  session  did  not  know  that  we  planned  to  conduct  two  different  market 
experiments.  At  the  beginning  of  each  session  they  were  informed  that  the  experiment  consisted  of 
8  periods.  After  8  periods  we  told  them  that  another  market  experiment  would  take  place  which 
aould  also  take  8  rounds.  This  arrangement  ensures  that  behaviour  in  the  first  treatment  is  not 
affected  by  the  fact  that  there  is  a  second  treatment  in  a  qession. E.  Fehr  et  ul.  / Europeun  Economic  Reciek  42  (IYW)  I  34  11 
Table  1 
Quality  cost  schedule 
(1  0. I  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  I 
(‘((1)  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  I5  18 
were  determined  according  to  Eqs.  (3) and  (4). For  the  RT  the  parameters  were 
as  follows:  2’ =  126, f  =  30,  q  E [O.l,  11. The  c(q)-schedule  was  given  by  Table  1. 
This  cost  schedule  is  a  discrete  approximation  of  the  function  c(q)  = 
(1Oq -  1)‘.3, which  exhibits  the  properties  assumed  in  Section  2. For  the  CT  we 
chose  J:~ =  246,  ,fc =  210.  In  all  four  sessions  we  paid  a  commission  fee  of 
4  Austrian  schillings  (4  AS?40  US-cents)  to  the  sellers  to  overcome  the  mar- 
ginal  unit  problem  which  would  arise  if p  =,f  =  30.  In  Sl  and  S2  buyers’  price 
offers  had  to  be multiples  of five.  In  S3 and  S4 prices  had  to  be multiples  of  1. The 
reason  for  this  change  was  that  if prices  have  to  be  multiples  of 5 it  may  be  more 
difficult  for  buyers  to  enforce  the  market  clearing  price  because  sellers  may  not 
accept  a  price  of 30 whereas  a  price  of 32, for  example,  is acceptable  for  them’  5. 
All  parameters  were  common  knowledge.  This  enabled  subjects  to  compute 
the  returns  of  their  trading  partners.  Before  the  beginning  of  the  experiments 
subjects  had  to  solve  several  exercises  which  involved  the  computation  of their 
own  returns  and  the  returns  of  a  hypothetical  trading  partner.  The  experiment 
did  not  start  until  all  subjects  had  solved  these  problems  correctly. 
6.  Experimental  results 
The  total  number  of possible  trades  in  both  the  CT  and  the  RT  was  216.  In  the 
CT  2 11 trades  were  conducted;  in  the  RT  2 13 trades  took  place.  On  average  one 
experimental  session  (8 periods  CT  plus  8 periods  RT)  lasted  for  3 h and  subjects 
earned  on  average  AS  325 (approximately  US$33).  In  the  CT  the  lowest  possible 
price  off,  =  210  was  observed  in  53 cases;  the  highest  observed  price  was  229. 
The  average  price  in  the  CT-experiments  was  215  and  sellers’  average  share  was 
0.14.  In  the  RT-experiments  trade  at  the  lowest  possible  price  of  30  was 
conducted  in  only  4 cases;  the  highest  price  offer  was  110 (1 case).  The  average 
price  in  all  RT-experiments  was  74  and  sellers’  average  share  was  0.46.  These 
data  already  indicate  that  sellers  received  a  considerably  larger  part  of  the 
surplus  (J>  -,f')  in  the  RT  than  of  the  surplus  (yL.  -,f,)  in  the  CT. 
One  of our  objectives  concerns  the  occurrence  of  reciprocal  behaviour.  Does 
the  majority  of  sellers  behave  reciprocally‘?  Do  those  who  behave  reciprocally 
dominate  the  aggregate  priceequality  relationship?  The  answer  is  given  by 
I5 In  Sl  and  S2 we paid  the  commission  fee ‘indirectly’  by  imposing  costs  of 26 AS  in the  RT (206  AS 
m the  CT)  if the  seller  delivered  the  good  at  mimmum  quality.  Since  prices  had  to  be multiples  of  5 the 
lowest  price  which  could  be  offered  was  30 (210)  which  yields  an  implicit  commission  fee of4  AS  in S3 
and  S4  the  commission  fee of  4  AS  was  paid  explicitly  and  costs  were  30  in  the  RT  (210  in  the  CT). Result  1: At  the  individual  level  reciprocal  behaviour  is  the  dominant  behav- 
ioural  pattern.  Moreover,  the  aggregate  relationship  between  prices  and  quality 
levels  is  positive. 
To  provide  evidence  for  Result  1 we computed  the  Spearman  rank  correlation’” 
between  p and  4, p(p, q), for each  seller.  In  total  we had  40 sellers  in  all  sessions.  For 
28 of these  p  is above  0.25  (see Table  2). Nine  sellers  exhibit  no  correlation  or  one 
that  is close  to  zero.  These  sellers  may  but  need  not  be  classified  as  purely  selfish 
types  because  our  data  only  show  sellers’  responses  to  some  wages  but  not  to  the 
whole  range  of wages”.  Three  sellers  exhibit  a  negative  relation  between  p and  q. 
For  those  sellers  who  traded  less  than  5  times  it  is  (by  the  definition  of  /I) 
impossible  that  the  Spearman  coefficient  reaches  significance  levels  below  10%. 
Unfortunately.  12 out  of  the  above  28  sellers  with  a  positive  p  traded  less  than 
five  times.  From  the  remaining  16 sellers  twelve  reach  a significance  level  of five 
percent  and  one  seller  reaches  10%  significance.  When  judging  these  results  one 
should  keep  in  mind  that  the  p  is  an  extremely  conservative  measure  of 
reciprocity”.  Despite  this  conservatism  13 sellers  exhibit  a significantly  positive 
correlation  between  quality  and  prices. 
The  behaviour  of  sellers  in  the  RT  also  gives  rise  to  a  positive  aggregate 
relation  between  quality  and  prices.  This  is  shown  in  Fig.  1 which  depicts  the 
relation  between  prices  and  average  (median)  quality.  The  number  over  each  bar 
in  Fig.  1 indicates  the  number  of observations  in  each  price  interval.  It  is obvious 
that  p and  pi are  positively  correlated.  For  all  10 prices  in  the  interval  30  I  p <  40, 
all  of  which  have  been  accepted  by  different  sellers,  q  =  0.1  was  chosen.  There 
were  22  offers  in  the  interval  40  I  p  <  50  which  were  accepted  by  16 different 
subjects.  In  16 out  of these  22  cases  sellers  chose  0.1;  in  4 cases  0.2.  The  average 
quality  was  0.145.  These  data  indicate  that  those  sellers  who  received  low  offers 
did  not  make  gifts  to  the  buyer,  that  is,  they  were  not  globally  altruistic. 
Notice  that  our  data  about  sellers’  quality  choices  are  two-sided  censored.  If 
a seller  would  have  preferred  to  choose  a  quality  level  below  0.1,  he  could  only 
choose  0.1  whereas  if he  would  have  preferred  to  choose  a  quality  above  1. he 
had  no  other  choice  than  1. Hence,  to  investigate  whether  the  positive  relation 
between  y and  p is  significant  we  ran  a  two-sided  censored  Tobit  regression  of 
I” For  a  description  of  the  Spearman  rank  corrclatlon  see  Siegel  and  Castellan  (1988). 
“For  example,  one  seller  traded  only  two  times.  He  got  p  =  46  two  times  and  hc  chose  q  =  0.1 
two  times  as  well.  Maybe.  for  p  >  60  he  would  have  chosen  0.5  which  would  have  rendered  his 
behaviour  reciprocal.  Moreover,  three  sellers  with  a  0  <  11 <  0.25  always  chose  q  >  0. I. There  was. 
for  example,  one  seller  who  was  able  to  catch  only  two  offers:  p  =  92  and  p  =  100.  He  chose  q  =  0.5 
two  times  but  perhaps  he  Lvould  have  chosen  a  lower  q  at  a  lower  p 
“For  example.  one  of  the  three  sellers  who  had  no  significantly  positive  corrclatlon  received 
wages  of  80.  85,  90.  95  to  which  he  responded  with  0.5.  0 7, 0.8,  0.8.  Although  this  bchawour  looks 
rather  reciprocal  the  Spearman  rank  correlation  is nut significantly  positive  at  the  ten  pet-cent  level 
in  this  case. E.  Fehr  rt  al. / European  Economic  Rwieu~ 42  (I WA’) I  34  13 
Table  2 
Spearman  rank  correlations  for  individual  sellers 
Seller  No 
1  2  3  4  5  6  I  8  9  10 
N  7  8  3  3  8  2  5  8  4  6 
P(P> 4)  0.72**  -  0.42  10  0.87  O.76**  1.0”  0.98**  0.96**  0.95”  0.86** 
Seller  No 
11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20 
IV  5  3  7  5  4  4  6  7  8  8 
P(P.  il)  0.34  0.88”  0.99**  0.03  1.0  0.00”  0.99**  0.14  o.g7**  0.00 
Seller  No. 
21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30 
N  2  4  6  8  2  8  6  2  8  8 
(0.  4)  0.00  -  0.26”  0.02  0.92**  1.0  0.00  0.65*  1  .o”  0.00  0.92** 
Seller  No 
31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 
N  3  8  4  2  5  5  8  8  4  3 
O(P. 4)  I .o  0.29  0.99”  0.00“  0.97**  0.97**  ~  0.65  0.53  1  .O”  1  .o” 
N  =  Number  of  observations. 
p(p.  q) =  Spearman  rank  correlation. 
**Significant  at  the  five  percent  level. 
*Significant  at  the  ten  percent  level. 
“Lack  of  data  (N  <  5)  rules  out  significance  below  10%. 
the  quality  level  on  (p -f).  The  specification  for  our  Tobit  regression  is given  by 
1 
0.9  if  RHS  2  0.9 
qi -  0.1  =  x +  /?(pi -,f)  +  illi  if  0  <  RHS  <  0.9  . 
1 
(7) 
0  if  RHS<O 
with  RHS  =  x +  /J(p; -.f)  +  ,LL~.  The  error  term  is normally  distributed  with  zero 
mean  and  constant  variance”.  If  the  slope  of  this  equation  turns  out  to  be 
significantly  positive,  CJ  is an  increasing  function  of p. If, in  addition,  the  intercept 
is  significantly  negative  or  if we  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  it  is  zero  we 
have  an  indication  that  sellers  are  not  globally  altruistic.  A nonpositive  x together 
“We  also  ran  Tobit  regressions  which  allowed  for  a  variable  variance  of  AL  across  prices  and 
across  periods.  If we  regress  with  the  data  of  single  sessions  neither  price  levels  nor  periods  affect  the 
variance  significantly.  If we  pool  the  data  of  all  sessions  the  variance  increases  significantly  with  p. 
More  importantly.  however,  for  each  session  the  sign.  the  size  and  the  significance  of x and  /j is rather 
similar  compared  to  specification  Eq.  (7). 14 
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Fig.  1.  The  price  qualit)  relation. 
with  a  positive  p  thus  means  that,  on  average,  sellers  exhibit  envious  or  selfish 
preferences  for  low  prices  while  for  high  prices  they  have  altruistic  preferences. 
Since  Tobit  regressions  rely  on  a  specific  functional  relation  between  4  and 
p we have  also  computed  the  (nonparametric)  Spearman  rank  correlation  for  the 
aggregate  data  of  each  session.  In  Table  3 the  results  of  our  Tobit  regressions 
and  the  Spearman  coefficients  are  presented.  For  each  session  as  well  as  for  the 
data  of all  sessions  p(y,  4) is positive  and  significant  below  the  one  percent  level. 
In  all  Tobit  regressions  Y is  negative.  In  the  regression  for  Sl,  S2  and  S3  x  is 
significant  at  the  1  ‘XI  level  while  in  S4 we cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  % =  0. 
This  indicates  that  sellers  were,  on  average.  not  globally  altruistic.  Low  wages 
triggered  low  quality  levels.  For  all  Tobit  regressions  the  slope  is  positive  and 
highly  significant.  We  also  ran  OLS  and  Tobit  regressions  with  and  without 
dummies  for  individual  sellers.  Again  all  P-coefficients  were  positive  and  highly 
significant.  In  addition,  the  inclusion  of dummies  increased  the  adjusted  R’  in  the 
OLS  regressions  considerably.  In  the  regressions  without  dummies  the  adjusted 
R2 is between  0.21  and  0.47:  with  dummies  the  regressions  explain  between  49% 
and  69%  of  the  variation  in  y.  This  increase  in  the  adjusted  R2  confirms  the 
presence  of individual  differences’“.  Taken  together  the  results  of Table  3 provide 
fairly  strong  evidence  that,  on  average,  4 is  an  increasing  function  of p. 
Due  to  the  anonymity  of the  trading  partners  it was  impossible  for  subjects  to 
reward  the  past  action  of  a  specific  subject.  A  buyer  could.  for  example.  not 
‘OThc  existence  of  individual  differences  is  also  suggested  by  other  tests.  Fat-  example. the 
hypothesis  that  individual  dummies  are  equal  to  the  constant  1 in  Table  3 is clearly  rejected  by  the 
data. Table  3 
Relation  between  quality  and  prices 
N  u 
Sl-s4  213  -  0.2233* 
Sl  48  ~  0.4844* 
s2  47  ~  0.1566* 
s3  54  ~  0.8916* 
s4  64  ~  0.2017 
N  =  number  of  observations. 
p(p.  ~1)  =  Spearman  rank  correlation. 
**Significant  at  the  one  percent  level. 
*Significant  at  the  five  percent  Icvcl. 
/I  l’(P.  (1) 
o.oog7**  0.43** 
0.0152**  0.60** 
0.0102**  0.69** 
0.0147**  0.52** 
0.01 lo*’  0.49** 
reward  a high  q in  period  t by  a high  wage  offer  in  period  t +  1 because  she  did 
not  know  the  seller’s  identity  in  period  r nor  could  she  address  her  offer  in  t +  1 
to  any  specific  seller.  Nonetheless,  in  case  that  buyers’  ~  for  whatever  reason 
-  respond  to  high  quality  in  t  with  high  wage  offers  in  t +  1 sellers’  quality 
choices  could  be  interpreted  as  an  investment  in  group  reputation.  A  seller  who 
chooses  high  quality  levels  would  then  provide  a public  good  because  he  induces 
buyers  to  make  generous  offers  to  the  group  of  sellers.  This  behaviour  is, 
of  course,  also  incompatible  with  conventional  theory  because  it  requires 
non  selfish  cooperation  among  sellers.  Yet.  since  we  know  from  numerous  public 
goods  experiments  (Ledyard,  199.5) that  there  is significantly  less  free-riding  than 
predicted  by  conventional  theory  this  possibility  should  be  taken  into  account. 
The  fact  that  sellers  respond  reciprocally  to  the  current  price  is evidence  against 
the  group  reputation  hypothesis.  Suppose,  for  a  moment,  that  buyers  respond 
positively  to  last  period’s  quality.  Under  these  conditions  sellers  should  not 
respond  reciprocally  to  the  current  price  if they  want  to  induce  high  future  prices. 
If they  choose  low  quality  levels  in  response  to  a low  current  price  they  cause  low 
future  prices  which  (in case  of reciprocal  q-choices)  give  rise  to low  future  prices,  etc. 
Thus,  the  desire  to  induce  high  future  prices  by  high  present  quality  levels  requires 
unconditionally  high  quality  levels.  But  these  are  not  observed  in  the  data”‘. 
Next  we  are  interested  in  the  question  whether  sellers’  reciprocal  responses 
rendered,  on  average,  a  high  price  policy  individually  profitable  for  the  buyers. 
This  question  is related  to  the  steepness  of the  q(p) relationship.  According  to  the 
buyers’  monetary  return  function  a  rising  q(p)-relationship  is  not  sufficient  for 
a  rising  &)-relationship.  Neither  is it  sufficient  that  sellers  value  B as  a normal 
”  To  further  investisatc  whether  there  were  strategic  spillovcrs  across  periods  we  ran  OLS  and 
two-sided  censored  Tobit  regressions  of p,  on  (I,-  ,.  Except  for  Sl  cl,_ I has  no  significant  impact  on 
p,.  Moreover.  the  adjusted  R’  of  the  OLS  regression  for  these  sessions  is  below  two  percent.  These 
results  show  that  even  if sellers  would  have  been  motivated  by  a  desire  to  induce  high  future  prices 
they  would  have  been  unable  to  do  so  in  S2.  S3  and  S4.  Only  m  Sl  r,,_ I has  a  significantly  positive 
impact  on  p,.  Yet.  in  SI  the  r-coeficient  of  regression  Eq.  (7)  is  also  significantly  negative.  that  is. 
sellers  did  not  choose  unconditionally  hgh  quahty  levels. good.  As  we  have  argued  in  Section  4.1  the  substitution  effect  of  a  rise  in 
p causes  a  B-reduction.  Only  if the  income  effect  of a p-rise  is strong  enough  to 
overcompensate  the  negative  substitution  effect,  a higher  p will  cause  a higher  B. 
Result  2  summarizes  the  evidence  on  this  point: 
Result  2: On  average,  there  is a  range  of prices  in  the  interval  [.f; ~1 of the  RT 
over  which  B rises  with  p and,  hence,  sellers  behave  as  if B is a  normal  good  in 
this  interval. 
If both,  sellers  and  buyers,  are  money  maximizers  and  if this  is known  by  the 
buyers  the  rational  buyer  will  offer  p  =  30 in  the  RT  because  she  anticipates  that 
sellers  will  chose  q =  0.1. At  this  outcome  sellers  earn  nothing  while  buyers  reap 
(126  -  30) -  0.1  =  AS  9.6. Fig.  2 shows,  however,  that  sellers’  reciprocal  actions 
enabled  firms  to  earn  considerably  more  than  AS  9.6.  The  Figure  depicts  the 
relationship  between  prices  and  buyers’  average  profits  in  SlLS4.  As  in  Fig.  1 the 
number  over  each  bar  denotes  the  number  of observations  in  each  price  interval. 
Fig.  2 gives  a first  hint  that  buyers  indeed  could  increase  their  average  profits 
by  increasing  the  price  above  f=  30.  According  to  the  regression  Eq.  (7)  the 
expected  quality  level  q'  is  given  by 
i 
1  if  RHS  2  1 
q'  =  0.1  + r + /l(p  - 30)  if  0.1  <  RHS  <  1  , 
0.1  if  RHS  I  0.1  1 
where  RHS  =  0.1  +  r  +  Ire,  -  30).  Given  the  above  equation  for  the  expected 
quality  level,  it  follows  that  q' exceeds  0.1  if  p >  p”  =  30 -  (SC/~).  As  long  as 
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q  >  0.1. In  Table  4 we used  the  estimates  of our  Tobit  regressions  to  compute  p” for 
each  session.  As we can  see, p0 varies  between  45.4 (S4) and  90.7 (S3), i.e. it is always 
below  126. For  p 2  p”, we can  compute  the  expected  monetary  return  for  a buyer, 
R”, by  inserting  q’  into  the  buyers’  return  function.  This  yields 
B’  =  (126  -  p).(O.l  +  x +  /I(p  -  30)) =  (12.6  +  126x  -  37XOp) 
+  (156fi  -  0.1  -  x)p  -  [jp2.  (8) 
I?’  as given  in  Eq.  (8) is a strictly  concave  function  of p.  Differentiating  Eq.  (8) 
with  respect  to  p  yields 
ciW/dp  =  B;  =  (156/j  -  0.1  -  ‘x) -  2bp.  (9) 
Substituting  the  results  of our  Tobit  estimates  into  Eq.  (9) and  evaluating  the 
resulting  expression  at  p”  gives  us  Bi(p’)).  Table  4 shows  the  value  of  BE(p’)  for 
each  session.  As  we  can  see,  in  each  session  a  rise  in  p  at  p”  increases  B”. This, 
together  with  the  fact  that  B”(p) =  0  at  p  =  J’  =  126, means  that  B’  has  a  max- 
imum  somewhere  between  p”  and  p  =  126.  Moreover,  since  B’(p)  is  strictly 
concave  the  price  which  maximizes  B  (subject  to  p  2  p(j) is  unique.  We  denote 
this  price  by  p*.  Table  4  reports  p*  and  B’(p*)  for  each  session.  Since  in  the 
interval  (p’,  p*)  the  average  behaviour  of  sellers  generates  a  strictly  increasing 
B”(p)-function,  B  is,  on  average,  a  normal  ‘good’  in  this  interval. 
In  general,  buyers  in  the  CT  may  have  two  reasons  to  offer  positive  shares  s,. 
They  may  anticipate  that  sellers  are  envious,  that  is, s:  >  0, and/or  they  may  be 
altruistic.  Buyers  in  the  RT  may  have  the  same  reasons  for  shares  s above  0. Yet, 
since  B(p)  is  a  rising  function  of p  over  some  feasible  interval  buyers  in  the  RT 
have  an  additional  reason  to  offer  high  prices.  Therefore,  if  sellers’  reciprocal 
behaviour  is anticipated  and  affects  buyers’  price  bids  it  shows  in  the  difference 
between  s and  s,.  This  leads  to 
Result  3: The  average  share  per  period  in  the  CT,  SE,  is below  the  average  share 
per  period,  ?,  in  the  RT. 
Evidence  in  favour  of R3  is provided  by  Fig.  3. In  all  periods  of all  4 sessions 
sa exceeded  sf. In  addition,  Fig.  3 indicates  no  tendency  for  .P to  approach  sz. In 
Table  4 
Based  on  Tobit  regressions  of  Table  3 
P0  YJ(PO)  P*  B’(P*)  B” 
Sl  61.9  0.875  90.6  18.95  16.81 
s2  45.4  0.723  80.8  20.84  16.34 
s3  90.7  0.420  104.9  6.54  8.37 
s4  48.3  0.754  82.6  20.70  20.82 
p” =  Price  above  which  sellers  chose  on  average  q  >  0.1.  B’p(p’) =  Increase  in  B’  at  p”  if p increases. 
p*  =  Price  which  maximizes  B’  subject  to  p  2  p”_ B’(p*)  =  Buyers  expected  return  in  RTs  at  p*. 
B” =  Actual  average  profit  per  period  in  RTs. 0.6 
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Fig.  3.  Average share  per  period. 
all  sessions  the  difference  between  9’  and  $  is  larger  in  the  final  periods 
compared  to  the  initial  periods  of  a  treatment. 
Remember  that  in  Section  4.2.  we  have  shown  that  for  all  types  of  sellers 
.(  2  sr.  If  we  take,  for  a  given  population  of  sellers.  the  averages  over  the 
reservation  shares,  which  we  denote  by  srn and  s5;‘,  sr  2  s’” must  hold.  Combin- 
ing  this  with  result  3 yields  s3 >  sz 2  SF 2  P’.  Or  in  other  words:  The  shares  that 
have  been  paid  to  sellers  in  the  RT  were.  on  average,  strictly  above  the  sellers’ 
reservation  shares.  This  means  that  prices  in  the  RT  do  not  correspond  to  the 
competitive  solution. 
Beyond  the  possibility  of examining  whether  the  outcome  in  the  RT  deviates 
from  the  compctitiur  solutim  OII merage  we  may  also  analyse  whether  specific 
sellers  who  could  not  trade  in  a certain  period  have  been  rationed  involuntarily, 
that  is,  whether  they  would  have  strictly  preferred  to  trade  at  the  prevailing 
shares.  The  lowest  share  which  NYU accepted  by  a certain  seller  in the  CT  gives  us 
an  upper  bound  for  his  reservation  share  in  the  RT.  By  comparing  this  upper 
bound  with  the  prevailing  shares  of  those  periods  of  the  RT  in  which  the  seller 
could  not  trade  we  can  infer  whether  the  RT  failed  to  clear  in  these  periods  for 
this  specific  seller.  If the  empirically  observed  upper  bound  on  sr is strictly  below 
the  prevailing  shares  the  seller  was  involuntarily  rationed. One  difficulty  with  the  above  method  is that  ‘the  prevailing  share’  of a  period 
is  not  a  unique  concept.  Is  it  the  highest,  the  average,  or  the  lowest  observed 
share?  To  overcome  this  problem  we  allowed  for  different  definitions  of  the 
‘prevailing  share’  in  our  next  result. 
Result  4: In  ~111  cases  in  which  a  seller  has  been  rationed  in  the  RT  the  lowest 
s,  which  has  been  accepted  by  that  seller  in  the  CT  is below  the  highest  and  the 
average  share  of  nonrationed  traders  in  the  (period  of  rationing  in  the)  RT. 
Moreover.  in  the  nzqjorit_r of rationing  cases  in  the  RT  the  rationed  sellers  would 
have  preferred  to  trade  at  the  lowest  share  of nonrationed  traders  (in  the  period 
of  rationing). 
In  all  sessions  taken  together  it  occurred  107  times  that  a  seller  could  not 
trade  in  the  RT.  In  u/l  107  cases  the  lowest  s,  which  was  accepted  by  the  non 
trading  sellers  in  the  CT  was  strictly  smaller  than  (i)  the  highest  and  (ii)  the 
average  s  of  those  periods  of  the  RT  in  which  the  sellers  were  rationed. 
Therefore,  in  all  107 cases  these  sellers  would  have  been  better  off at  the  highest 
and  the  average  prices  of that  period.  Moreover,  in  72 out  of  107 cases  (67.3%) 
the  rationed  sellers  accepted  an  s,  in  the  CT  that  was  below  the  lowest  share  of 
the  period  of  rationing  in  the  RT.  Thus,  for  a  majority  of  rationing  cases  the 
rationed  sellers  would  have  been  better  of even  at  the  lowest  share  of the  period. 
Recall  that  in  the  remaining  35 cases  rationing  may  also  have  been  involuntary 
(relative  to  the  lowest  share  in  the  RT)  because  the  lowest  accepted  offer  in  the 
CT  provides  only  an  upper  bound  for  si.  Perhaps  rationed  sellers  would  have 
accepted  an  s  strictly  less  than  this  upper  bound. 
7.  Summary  and  interpretation 
The  experimental  results  reported  in  this  paper  indicate  that  the  existence  of 
opportunities  for  reciprocation  may  significantly  alter  market  outcomes.  In  our 
RT  sellers  persistently  behaved  reciprocally.  They  responded  to  low  prices  with 
minimum  quality  choices  whereas  if  prices  were  raised  they  reciprocated  by 
choosing  non  minimum  quality  levels.  At  the  individual  level  reciprocal  actions 
represent  the  most  frequent  behavioural  pattern.  This  contributes  to  a  signifi- 
cantly  positive  relation  between  prices  and  quality  levels  at  the  aggregate  level. 
Moreover,  this  relationship  was  sufficiently  strong  to  render  the  payment  of high 
prices  individually  profitable  for  buyers.  The  comparison  of sellers’  shares  in  the 
RT  with  their  shares  in  the  CT  shows  that  sellers’  reciprocal  responses  had 
a  systematic  impact  on  prices.  In  this  respect  the  comparison  between  the  last 
period  of the  CT  (RT)  and  the  first  period  of the  RT  (CT)  is most  telling.  When 
subjects  enter  the  RT  after  the  CT  (Sl  and  S3) there  is a large  increase  in  sellers’ 
share  in  the  first  period  of the  RT  (see  Fig.  3). When  they  enter  the  CT  after  the 
RT  (S2 and  S4) sellers’  share  decreases  substantially  in  the  first  period  of the  CT. 
In  our  view  these  regularities  provide  strong  evidence  for  a price  raising  effect  of 20  E.  Frhv  et  al.  i European  Economic  Review  42  (I  YYK) I-34 
sellers’  reciprocal  behaviour.  Buyers  seem  to  have  anticipated  sellers’  reciprocity 
in  the  RT  and.  as  a  consequence.  offered  sellers  higher  shares  in  the  RT. 
Our  favourite  interpretation  of sellers’  behaviour  is  based  on  the  assumption 
that  they  are  conditionally  altruistic.  In  this  view  the  behaviour  of  reciprocal 
sellers  is  fully  rational.  Low  prices  imply  that  sellers’  monetary  payoffs  are 
relatively  low  compared  to  the  monetary  payoff  of  ‘their’  buyers.  This  renders 
them  selfish  or  envious,  that  is,  they  choose  a  low  quality.  A  high  price  implies 
that  sellers  are  comparatively  well  off which  renders  them  altruistic.  As  a result 
they  respond  with  generous  quality  levels.  In  the  theoretical  part  of  this  paper 
we  have  shown  that  on  the  basis  of  these  assumptions  on  preferences,  the 
positive  relation  between  prices  and  buyers’  expected  profits  implies  that  sellers 
value  buyers’  monetary  payoffs  as  a  normal  ‘good’.  Moreover.  the  prevailing 
prices  in  the  RT  are,  in  general.  above  sellers’  reservation  prices.  This  means  that 
prices  in  the  RT  represent  a  non  competitive  outcome.  Notice  that  our  inter- 
pretation  of  the  RT-data  does  not  mean  that  we  consider  the  RT  to  be  out  of 
equilibrium.  Quite  the  contrary,  if sellers’  reciprocal  responses  are  the  result  of 
rational  preference  maximisation  and  if  buyers  rationally  anticipate  sellers’ 
behaviour  persistently,  high  prices  may  well  reflect  an  underlying  equilibrium. 
We  ‘only’  claim  that  the  RT-outcome  is  non  competitive. 
An  alternative  interpretation  of  our  results  might  rely  on  the  conjecture  that 
subjects  were  hesitant  to  choose  unfair  actions  because  they  knew  that  the 
experimenter  could  observe  them.  For  several  reasons  we  doubt  that  the  observ- 
ability  of  actions  by  the  experimenter  is  behaviourally  relevant  in  our  context. 
First  of  all,  sellers  who  received  prices  between  30  and  50  did  in  general  not 
hesitate  to  choose  minimum  quality  levels  in  our  RT.  Nor  did  buyers  hesitate  to 
offer  prices  close  tofc  in  the  CT.  Secondly,  Berg  et al. (1995) conducted  reciprocity 
experiments  in  which  the  experimenter  could  not  observe  the  actions  of  indi- 
viduals.  Only  aggregate  results  could  be  observed.  They  indicate  a  substantial 
amount  of reciprocal  behaviour.  Thirdly,  the  results  of  Bolton  and  Zwick  (1995), 
who  conducted  fully  anonymous  ultimatum  games,  also  indicate  that  observabil- 
ity  of actions  by  the  experimenter  does  not  change  subjects’  behaviour. 
A more  important  objection  against  our  interpretation  concerns  the  fact  that 
we  had  8  market  periods  in  each  treatment.  In  principle,  this  may  create 
opportunities  for  strategic  and  reputational  spillovers  across  periods.  However. 
we  have  taken  great  care  in  preventing  such  spillovers  by  enforcing  strict 
anonymity  between  trading  partners.  Due  to  the  anonymity  requirements  in  our 
design  it  was  definitely  not  possible  that  in&vi&~/  sellers  or  buyers  developed 
a reputation.  Nor  was  it  possible  that  past  actions  of any  specific  buyer  or  seller 
could  be  rewarded.  Therefore,  in  our  view  any  reputational  or  strategic  spillovers 
have  to  rely  on  group  effects.  Perhaps  a majority  of co-operative,  group-oriented 
sellers  wanted  to  induce  high  future  prices  by  choosing  high  current  quality  levels. 
In  the  previous  section  we  have,  however,  shown  that  reciprocal  quality  choices 
are  incompatible  with  this  view.  Sellers  who  try  to  induce  high  future  prices  must E.  Fehr  ef  al.  /  Europeun  Economic  Rei-ien  42  (I  998)  I-34  21 
not  respond  reciprocally  to  the  current  price.  They  have  to choose  unconditionally 
high  quality  levels.  In  addition,  in  all  but  one  session  we  could  not  detect  any 
statistical  effect  of current  quality  levels  on  future  prices.  Thus  the  data  indicate 
that  the  above  mentioned  spillover  was  not  relevant  in  our  RT. 
The  potential  effect  discussed  in  the  previous  paragraph  is, of course,  not  the 
only  possibility  for  group  reputation  to  play  a  role.  In  principle  there  are  many 
other  possibilities  and  there  seems  only  one  method  which  rules  them  out  with 
certainty:  The  conduct  of  one-shot  experiments.  In  a  recent  paper  by  Fehr 
et  al.  (1994)  the  results  of  a  one-shot  reciprocity  treatment  are  reported.  The 
Fehr  et  al.-design  has  the  following  features:  Ten  buyers  interact  with  ten  sellers 
over  ten  periods  but  each  buyer  is matched  bilaterally  with  each  seller  only  once. 
This  matching  procedure  is common  knowledge.  A buyer  makes  a price  propo- 
sal  to  a  seller.  If  the  seller  accepts  he  has  to  choose  q  and  bears  costs  ~((1) 
according  to  Table  1. If he  rejects  the  offer,  both  players  earn  zero.  This  design 
combines  features  of  the  ultimatum  game  with  features  of  our  RT.  Due  to  the 
one-shot  nature  of  these  experiments  it  never  pays  for  a  subject  to  invest 
anything  in  group  reputation.  Fehr  et  al.  (1994)  also  conducted  competitive 
market  experiments  with  reciprocation  opportunities  (like  our  RT)  to  allow  for 
a comparison  of the  bilateral  one-shot  experiments  with  the  competitive  market 
experiments.  Their  results  indicate  that  sellers  also  respond  reciprocally  in 
a one-shot  situation.  Sellers’  response  pattern  in  the  one-shot  situation  is rather 
similar  compared  to  their  behaviour  in  a competitive  market  with  reciprocation 
opportunities.  Moreover,  as  in  our  RT  sellers’  shares  both  in  the  one-shot 
situation  and  in  the  market  situation  are  on  average  between  40  and  4.5%.  The 
statistical  tests  conducted  show  that  there  is  w  significant  difference  between 
sellers’  shares  in  the  one-shot  and  the  repeated  market  situation. 
A further  objection  that  is frequently  raised  against  experimental  data  is that 
the  monetary  payoffs  in  experiments  are  small  relative  to  the  stake  levels  in  real 
life.  In  our  experiments  the  participants  earned  on  average  $33.  However,  Fehr 
and  Tougareva  (1995)  have  replicated  the  experiments  of  Fehr  et  al.  (1994)  in 
Moscow  with  very  high  stakes.  On  average  subjects  in  the  Fehr-Tougareva 
experiments  earned  between  two  and  three  times  their  monthly  income  in  a  two 
hour  session.  Despite  this  high  stake  level  no  decline  in  the  impact  of reciprocity 
on  the  market  outcome  could  be  observed.  This  indicates  that  the  results 
presented  in  this  paper  are  not  just  an  artefact  of low  stakes.  Reciprocity  and  gift 
exchange  give  rise  to  noncompetitive  outcomes  even  under  rather  high  stakes. 
Our  model  in  Section  4 and  our  interpretation  of the  RT-data  imply  that  the 
amount  of excess  supply  does  not  play  a role  in  the  formation  of prices.  If sellers’ 
reciprocity  is  sufficiently  strong  buyers’  expected  profits  are  a  strictly  concave 
and  increasing  function  of  prices.  Therefore.  as  long  as  there  is  a  non  negative 
excess  supply,  i.e. as long  as buyers  can  be  sure  to  find  at least  one  seller,  they  can 
set  their  prices  irrespective  of  the  extent  of excess  supply.  In  our  view,  the  fact. 
that  in  the  Fehr  et  al.-experiments  sellers  received  the  same  shares  in  the one-shot  (bilateral)  experiments  as  in  the  market  experiments  with  an  excess 
supply  of  sellers,  supports  our  interpretation  of  the  data. 
Finally,  we  would  like  to  relate  our  data  and  our  interpretation  to  the 
approaches  of  Binmore  and  Samuelson  (1994:  BS)  and  Roth  and  Erev  (1993; 
RE).  These  authors  explain  the  stylised  facts  of  ultimatum  games  in  terms  of 
evolutionary  models  (BS)  or  in  terms  of  psychological  learning  models  (RE). 
Both  in  BS  and  in  RE  subjects  do  not  act  rationally  on  the  basis  of  consistent 
preferences.  They  follow,  instead,  behavioural  patterns  that  are  ~  at  least 
initially  ~  ill-adapted  to  the  game  being  played.  Their  actions  are  ill-adapted  in 
the  sense  that  they  do  not  maximize  subjects’  monetary  returns  in  the  one-shot 
game.  The  simulations  conducted  by  BS and  RE  show  that  these  ‘mistakes’  can 
survive  even  in  the  long  run.  i.e.  adaptive  forces  need  not  cause  convergence  to 
the  subgame  perfect  equilibrium  of  the  ultimatum  game. 
We  cannot  rule  out  that  the  mechanisms  that  have  been  stipulated  by  BS and 
RE  also  play  a role  in  our  experiments.  Perhaps  the  reciprocal  responses  of our 
sellers  in  the  RT  are  not  driven  by  the  rational  pursuit  of consistent  preferences 
but  by  a  behavioural  impulse  to  reciprocate  that  has  been  ‘inherited’  from 
repeated  interactions  in  the  real  world.  If that  were  the  case  our  task  of proving 
that  non  trading  sellers  in  our  RT  have  been  involuntarily  rationed  is much  easier 
because  we  could  identify  sellers’  reservation  prices  with  the  induced  valuef:  The 
systematic  and  large  gap  between  actual  prices  and  the  sellers’  reservation  pricej’in 
our  RT  would  then  be  an  unambiguous  indicator  for  a non  competitive  outcome. 
Appendix  A.  Summary  of  the  instructions  (for  data  see  Appendix  B) 
A. 1.  General  (for  both  market  sides) 
The  experiment  you  will  participate  in  serves  the  purpose  of  analysing 
decision  behaviour  in  markets.  The  instructions  are  simple  and  if you  read  them 
carefully  and  make  appropriate  decisions  you  can  earn  a  considerable  amount 
of money.  At  the  end  of the  whole  experiment  all  the  profits  you  have  made  by 
your  decisions  will  be  added  and  paid  to  you  in  cash. 
The  experiment  you  will  participate  in  consists  of  2 stages.  In  the  first  stage 
6 of you  act  as  buyers  and  9 of you  are  in  the  role  of sellers.  In  the  second  stage 
the  sellers  will  determine  the  value  of  the  good  for  the  buyers. 
A.2.  Spec$c  instructions  for  sellers  in  the  RT-experirnrnt 
In  the  market  one  good  is traded  and  each  seller  sells  the  same  good.  A  seller 
can  sell  this  good  to  any  buyer  and  a  buyer  can  buy  it  from  every  seller.  Every 
buyer  can  offer  a price  that  will  be communicated  to  us  by  telephone.  We  write 
these  offers  on  the  blackboard  and  you  can  accept  one  of  these  offers.  If  e.g. 
a price  of 50 is offered  and  you  as  seller  number  5 want  to  accept  this  offer  you just  say:  ‘Number  5 sells  for  50’. In  this  case  the  trade  is concluded,  the  good  is 
sold  to  the  buyer  who  made  the  offer  of  50.  The  buyer  will  not  know  your 
identity,  he  will  just  know  that  his  offer  is  accepted. 
You  can  sell  at  most  one  unit  of the  good  on  each  trading  day  and  each  buyer 
can  also  buy  at  most  one  unit  of  the  good  per  trading  day.  Each  seller  may 
accept  an  offer  or  not,  but  the  sellers  cannot  make  counteroffers.  After  3 minutes 
the  market  is closed  and  the  second  stage  of the  trading  day  is conducted.  After 
this  a  new  trading  day  starts.  On  the  whole  there  will  be  8 trading  days. 
At  the  second  stage  of a trading  day  you  can  fix  the  value  the  good  will  have 
for  the  buyers.  Buyers  receive  a certain  amount  of experimental  money  (reselling 
price)  from  us  for  each  unit  they  have  bought.  This  reselling  price  can  be  found 
in  the  middle  of  the  parameter  sheet  distributed  to  you.  The  profit  of  a  buyer 
(measured  in  experimental  money)  is  the  difference  between  the  reselling  price 
and  the  price  at  which  he  has  bought  the  good  from  you.  If  ‘your’  buyer  has 
bought  the  good  for  205  and  the  reselling  price  is  405  he  makes  a  profit  of 
405  -  205  =  200  (measured  in  experimental  money). 
How  much  one  unit  of experimental  money  is worth  for  ‘your’  buyer  depends 
on  you.  By  the  choice  of  a  conversion  rate  you  decide  how  much  real  money 
‘your’  buyer  gets  from  us  for  one  unit  of experimental  money.  If you  choose  e.g. 
the  rate  0.5 your  buyer  gets  100 ATS  for  200  units  of experimental  money.  At  the 
lower  part  of  the  parameter  sheet  you  can  find  the  feasible  range  for  the 
conversion  rate.  Fill  in  your  decision  in  the  decision  sheet  distributed  to  you.  Do 
not  announce  your  decision  publicly. 
You  as  a  seller  have  two  kinds  of  costs,  production  costs  and  decision  costs 
that  arise  from  your  decision  on  the  conversion  rate.  You  bear,  of course,  costs 
only  in  case  of a deal.  If you  do  not  trade  on  a certain  day  your  costs  are  zero  on 
this  day.  Production  costs  are  shown  on  the  upper  part  of the  pararmeter  sheet. 
Decision  costs  depend  on  your  choice  of  the  conversion  rate.  The  higher  the 
conversion  rate  you  decide  to  give  to  ‘your’  buyer  the  higher  are  your  decision 
costs.  The  decision  costs  are  noted  in  the  lower  part  of the  parameter  sheet.  You 
will  get  a commission  fee of ATS  4 for  each  trade  conducted.  Hence,  your  profit 
paid  in  ATS  is  given  by: 
profit  =  price  -  production  costs  -  decision  costs  +  commission  fee 
If e.g.  you  sell  your  good  for  175 while  your  production  costs  are  100  and  you 
choose  a  conversion  rate  of  0.6  that  is  associated  with  decision  costs  of  5 your 
profits  are  given  by:  175  -  100  -  5 +  4 =  74. 
A.3.  Spec~jir  instmctions  for  buyem  in  the  RT-experiment 
In  the  market  one  good  is traded  and  each  seller  sells  the  same  good.  A seller 
can  sell  this  good  to  any  buyer  and  a  buyer  can  buy  it  from  every  seller.  If 
you  are  e.g.  buyer  no.  7 and  you  want  to  offer  a  price  of  215,  you  have  to  say: 24  E.  Frhr  et  al.  : Europear~ Economic  Rrarew  42  (I 998)  I-34 
‘Buyer  7 offers  2 15.’ To  avoid  losses  for  you  as  buyer  as  well  as  for  the  sellers 
these  offers  must  not  be  lower  than  the  production  costs  announced  on  the 
parameter  sheet  and  they  must  not  be  higher  than  the  reselling  values  also 
announced  on  the  parameter  sheet.  The  offers  will  be  communicated  to  the  sellers 
by  us  via  telephone.  The  sellers  will  not  know  your  identity>  i.e.  your  buyer 
number;  they  will  only  know  the  price  offered.  If a seller  accepts  an  offer  you  will 
be  informed  by  us.  In  this  case  an  agreement  is concluded.  the  good  is purchased 
by  you  at  the  offered  price.  On  each  trading  day  you  can  buy  at  most  one  unit  of 
the  good  and  each  seller  can  also  sell  at  most  one  unit  of the  good  per  day.  If your 
offer is not  accepted  you  are  free  to change  your  offer.  i.e. to make  a new  offer.  But 
the  new  price  you  offer  must  be  higher  than  all  prices  that  have  not  been  accepted 
so far.  Each  seller  may  accept  an  offer  or  not,  but  he cannot  make  a counteroffer. 
After  3 minutes  the  market  is closed  and  you  can  no  longer  buy  a  good  on  this 
day.  Then  the  second  stage  of the  trading  day  will  be  conducted.  After  this  a new 
trading  day  starts.  On  the  whole  there  will  be  8 trading  days. 
At  the  second  stage  of the  trading  day  the  seller  who  has  sold  the  good  to you  on 
this  day  can  fix the  value  the  good  will  have  for  you.  You  as  a  buyer  get  a certain 
amount  of  experimental  money  (reselling  price)  from  us  for  each  unit  you  have 
bought.  This  reselling  price  is shown  in  the  upper  part  of the  parameter  sheet.  Your 
profit  (measured  in experimental  money)  is the  difference  between  the  reselling  price 
and  the  price  at  which  you  have  bought  the  good.  If you  bought  the  good  for  205 
and  the  reselling  price  is 405  you  make  a  profit  of: 405  -  205  =  200  (measured  in 
experimental  money).  How  much  one  unit  of experimental  money  is worth  to  you 
depends  on  ‘your’  seller.  By  the  choice  of a conversion  rate  he  decides  how  much 
real  money  you  receive  from  us  for  one  unit  of experimental  money.  The  range  of 
feasible  conversion  rates  can  be  seen  in  the  lower  part  of the  parameter  sheet.  If he 
chooses  e.g. the  rate  0.5 you  will  get  100 ATS  for  200  units  of experimental  money. 
If a seller  makes  a deal  he gets  a commission  fee of ATS  4. Furthermore,  sellers 
have  two  kinds  of costs,  production  costs  and  decision  costs  that  arise  from  the 
decision  on  the  conversion  rate.  Production  costs  are  listed  in  the  middle  of the 
parameter  sheet,  the  decision  costs  associated  with  a certain  conversion  rate  are 
shown  in  the  lower  part  of  the  parameter  sheet.  As  you  can  see  from  the 
parameter  sheet  the  higher  the  conversion  rate  ‘your’  seller  chooses  the  greater 
are  his  decision  costs.  Hence,  the  profit  of  the  sellers  paid  in  ATS  is  given  by: 
profit  =  price  -  production  costs  -  decision  costs  +  commission  fee. 
If e.g. you  have  bought  the  good  for  175 while  the  production  costs  are  100 and 
the  seller  chooses  a conversion  rate  of 0.6 which  is associated  with  decision  costs 
of  5 the  profits  of  ‘your’  seller  are  given  by:  175  -  100  -  5 +  4  =  74. 
Appendix  B. 
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